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S

cholarship of the American founding remains divided as to the nature
of Anti-Federalist political philosophy. One school of thought contends
that the Anti-Federalists were the heirs of the republican tradition, while
the other maintains that the Anti-Federalists operated from a liberal
worldview. Thus in what manner and to what extent Anti-Federalists draw upon
the republican and/or liberal political traditions remains unclear. In answering
this question I examine the writings of the Anti-Federalist Cato, analyzing what
conceptualizations characterize Anti-Federalist thought and from what traditions
of political philosophy these ideas arose. I also analyzie texts of the major traditions
that my have had a formative inﬂuence on Anti-Federalist thought in order to
provide a basis of comparison with the Anti-Federalists. As the Anti-Federalists
played a crucial role in creating the Bill of Rights, these understandings will
establish a framework for interpreting its role in American governance and
jurisprudence.
Unlike their Federalist counterparts, the nature of whose political theory
is widely agreed upon, the Anti-Federalists continue to stir debate over
how to characterize their political philosophy. Various interpretations have
categorized the Anti-Federalists as classical republicans, modern republicans
and liberals. This inability to arrive at a consensus is perhaps best illustrated
by Gordon Wood’s work on the subject. In Creation of the American Republic,
Wood characterized the Anti-Federalists as traditionalists operating from a
republican political worldview.1 Subsequently, Wood has revised his position
on the Anti-Federalists, describing the Anti-Federalists as political innovators
who break from traditional republican political principals and embrace
liberal ones.2 These contrasting analyses are endemic of the disagreement
that permeates scholarship on Anti-Federalist political philosophy. Given the
diversity of opinions and lack of consensus over the nature of Anti-Federalist
political thought, a more narrowly focused study that simultaneously tests
for both liberal and republican inﬂuences in Anti-Federalist thought is
warranted.
The opportunity for such a study is provided in the writings of the AntiFederalist Cato. Focusing on Cato allows for a natural experiment as his
political theory can be compared to three other works of political theory
that present political philosophy using the motif of the Roman statesman
Cato the Younger. These three Catos – Plutarch’s “Life of Cato the Younger,”
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Joseph Addison’s Cato: A Tragedy and John Trenchard and
Thomas Gordon’s Cato’s Letters: OR, Essays on Liberty, Civil
and Religious, and Other Important Subjects – correspond to the
classical republican, modern republican and liberal traditions,
respectively. Implementation of this natural experiment reveals
that in regards to the mechanisms required for the supervision
and safe operation of government and the ills of the governors
possessing interests divergent from those of the governed, the
Anti-Federalist Cato operates from the basis of a liberal political
theory.
Liberalism: An Overview
In the liberal tradition, men preexist government and only
create it for their “mutual preservation and defense,” so that
they may enjoy liberty, which they possess as a natural right,
and its beneﬁts.3 In order to ensure that government serves these
ends, a number of safeguards are implemented by which the
people can monitor their government and inﬂuence its actions.
These mechanisms include numerous representatives, frequent
elections and rotation in ofﬁce.4 Such precautions serve to bind
the interests of the governors to those of the governed, which
is essential to ensuring that those in government act for the
beneﬁt of the people as “most men will act for interest against
duty, as often as they dare.”5 This supremacy of interest over
duty necessitates that government be structured in such a way
as to make it in men’s interest to do their duty. Hence the use
of frequent elections to create constant competition among the
people for elected positions.6 This constant competition makes
it in the interest of those in government to do their duty, as if
they do not, they will simply be voted out of ofﬁce in the near
future.7 Liberal government is thus structured so as to give the
people control in ensuring that it protects their liberty instead
of curtailing it.
Political Liberty: The Centrality of Representation
While liberty is the great end for which government it formed,
it is not a monolithic concept. Cato’s understanding of liberty
is twofold. The ﬁrst type of liberty that Cato is concerned with
is political liberty. Political liberty takes the form of freedom
from government tyranny. Accordingly, Cato advocates placing
numerous restrictions upon the governors that are designed
to preserve the people’s liberty. These protections serve to
prevent the consolidation of power into one of a few hands
with sufﬁcient time to use them to establish and perpetuate
despotism.8 Fundamentally, these safeguards are designed to
make the governors accountable and responsive to the people.
This is particularly evident when Cato insists on the direct
election of the executive on the grounds that otherwise “the
president cannot represent you [the people] because he is not
of your [the people’s] own immediate choice.”9 But, where that
direct choice exists, accountability and responsiveness follow.
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Furthermore, all citizens must possess the ability to partake
in directly selecting the governors.10 If not all of the citizenry
are able to participate in the selection of the members of their
government, than those in power would be able to perpetuate
their own authority.11 This continuation in power would
occur by using a numerical minority to elect a government
of a composition that is both favorable to the governors and
not what the totality of the electorate would have chosen.12
Additionally, the other fundamental manner in which these
mechanisms operate is to create constant competition among
those seeking ofﬁce to demonstrate who among them can best
serve the people as the frequency with which they must answer
to the people for their actions prevents them from following
their own course independent of the people’s will.13 Thus, the
structures of government are designed speciﬁcally to maintain
the people’s freedom from arbitrary rule.
Despite its being formed by the consent of the governed, Cato
does not see government as something that can be left alone
to run its course. When it comes to preserving the ends of
government, “a general presumption that rulers will govern
well is not a sufﬁcient security;” a sentiment that Trenchard
and Gordon’s Cato shares.14 To ensure the proper operation
of government, the people must supervise their government.15
Perhaps the most direct way that the people are able to do this
is through a participatory representation, a subject on which
Cato refers his readers to the writings of the Anti-Federalist
Brutus on the grounds that “this subject has been so ably and
fully treated by a writer under the signature of Brutus, that
I shall content myself with referring you to him thereon.”16
Cato’s referral serves as grounds for consideration of the two
writers’ views on representation in tandem, as two disciples of
the same principles of representation.
Before examining the nature of representation according to
Brutus, it is important to ﬁrst consider the role representation
plays in Brutus’s conception of government. To Brutus,
government has no natural right to its authority, and therefore
draws its legitimacy from the consent of those who choose to
form it.17 The reason men decide to thus leave the state of nature
by forming government is that in each individual pursuing his
own ends in the state of nature, “the possessions or enjoyments
of one were sacriﬁced to the views and designs of another; thus
the weak were prey to the strong, the simple and unwary were
subject to impositions from those who were more crafty and
designing. In this state of things, every individual was insecure.”18
To alleviate this insecurity, men consent among themselves to
form government with the purpose of protecting their natural
rights, including liberty.19 These liberties are protected by “the
whole force of the community,” which, placed in the hands of
government, is used to enforce the rule of law.20 To ensure that
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the government is dutiful in using the rule of law to carry out
its function of protecting natural rights, the people have the
right to remove from government those who fail to properly
protect the people’s natural rights.21 Accordingly, “a full and
just representation of the people,” the deﬁning feature of free
government, is required so that the people can exercise their
will to ensure that government fulﬁlls its purpose of protecting
natural rights through the rule of law.22 If such representation
is lacking, “let the administration be good or ill, it still will
be government, not according to the will of the people, but
according to the will of the few.”23
The fundamental principle upon which Brutus builds his
theory of representation is that the relationship between the
people and their representatives is that of principal and agent.24
Representation is the mechanism by which the people “give
their assent to the laws by which they are governed,” and
accordingly it is the function of the representatives to “declare
the sentiments of the people.”25 This requires the representatives
to know and understand the needs, wants and will of the
people, “for if they [the representatives] do not know, or are
not disposed to speak the sentiments of the people, the people
do not govern, but the sovereignty is in a few.”26 That failure by
the representatives to accurately carryout the will of the people,
thus substituting their own will for the will of the people, shifts
governance from the people to a smaller body of individuals
is essential as Brutus maintains that the people consenting to
the laws “is the true criterion between free government and an
arbitrary one.”27 Consequently, representatives as agents of the
people are necessary for the people to ensure that government
acts in accordance with the purpose for which they established
it, the preservation of their natural right of liberty. In conceiving
of representative as agent, Brutus echoes the sentiment of Cato’s
Letters, where the prospering functioning of government requires
that the people select “deputies, whose interest is the same with
their own [sic], and whose property is so intermingled with
theirs, and so engaged upon the same bottom, that principles
and deputies must stand and fall together,” and therefore the
deputies, the representatives of the people, will act as proper
agents of their principles, the people.28
The most basic mechanism for preserving such a system is
annual elections. The Anti-Federalist Cato favors annual
elections on the grounds that “power connected, with a
considerable duration, may be dangerous to the liberties of a
republic.”29 This danger stems from the fact that a long term
in ofﬁce delays the individual’s accountability to the people,
presenting man’s ambition with the opportunity to thwart his
duty.30 Just as Trenchard and Gordon’s Cato sees the opportunity
for self-aggrandizement winning out over duty whenever the
opportunity arises unaccompanied by signiﬁcant consequences,
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so the Anti-Federalist Cato views terms of extended duration as
causing those in government to pursue their own ends instead
of the will of the people.31 Any time the term of ofﬁce is for
“any considerable time,” the ofﬁceholder “fancies that he may be
great and glorious by oppressing his fellow citizens.”32 To counter
such a threat, the Anti-Federalist Cato favors annual elections,
asserting that, with the constant competition they create, the
people “never will want [lack] men to execute whatever you
[the people] could design.”33 The constant competition thus
forces ofﬁceholders to remain continually abreast of the will of
the people and carry it, and only it, into execution in order to
remain in ofﬁce. Therefore, annual elections, the penultimate
example of the frequent elections argued for in Cato’s Letters, by
providing for short terms in ofﬁce, prevent the governors from
viewing their time in ofﬁce as sufﬁciently long to allow them
to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the people without
fear of electoral reprisals and instead bind representatives to the
will of the people as true agents.34
In order for this system to function properly, it is necessary
that these agents must represent the will of the entire
people.35 Accordingly, more is needed than simply annual
elections. Numerous representatives are required to ensure
that the representative body is “capable of understanding
the true interests of the society for which it acts.”36 Such
understanding is only possible when the representatives of
the people “are sufﬁciently numerous to be acquainted with
the local condition and wants of the different districts” of the
nation.37 In order to be acquainted with their constituents
in such a manner, it is necessary that the representatives be
chosen from among the people they are to represent, because
“the very term, representative, implies, that the person or body
chosen for this purpose, should resemble those who appoint
them—a representation of the of the people of America, if it be
a true one, must be like the people.”38 For Brutus this means
that representation should be based on the characteristics of
the people.39 Therefore, “the farmer, the merchant, mecanick,
and other various orders of people, ought to be represented
according to their respective weight and numbers” in society.40
Additionally, to properly function as representatives, “the
representatives ought to be intimately acquainted with the
wants, understand the interests of the several orders of society,
and feel a proper sense and becoming zeal to promote their
prosperity.”41 In order to bring such a circumstance about “each
class [of men] ought to have an opportunity of choosing their
best informed men for the purpose [serving as representative].”42
Thus, for any country, and especially one as large as the United
States, representation must be numerous in order to properly
represent all facets of the people and their will, for “one man,
or a few men cannot possibly represent the feelings, opinions,
and characters of a great multitude.”43
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A second major reason why annual elections must be for numerous
representatives is that a small number of representatives, such
as called for in the proposed Constitution, are “too few to resist
the inﬂuence of corruption, and the temptation to treachery.”44
Brutus concurs with Cato’s assessment, asserting with regards
to the proposed size of Congress that “there will be no security
in so small a body, against bribery, and corruption.”45 That
a majority of a quorum of the legislature has the power to
legislate causes him to warn that “twenty-ﬁve men will have
the power to give away all the property of the citizens of these
states – what security therefore can there be for the people,
where the liberties and property are at the disposal of so few
men? It will literally be a government in the hands of the few to
oppress the many.”46 This danger is especially acute considering
the power the executive can utilize to corrupt the legislature,
for “this government will have in their gift a vast number of
ofﬁces of great honor and emolument. The members of the
legislature are not excluded from appointments; and twentyﬁve of them, as the case may be, being secured, any measure
may carry.”47 In this manner, the small size of the legislature
makes it easy for the executive to corrupt them into favoring
the executive’s policies regardless of the will of the people,
which it is the representatives’ duty to follow. Moreover, Brutus
addresses not just the former of Cato’s qualms, corruption, but
also the latter, treachery. Brutus considers treachery a very real
and very likely possibility on the grounds that “it is not to be
expected that a legislature will be found in any country that will
not have some of its members, who will pursue their private
ends, and for which they will sacriﬁce the public good.”48
Furthermore, this threat exists not from one individual, or
even multiple individuals each acting alone for his own limited
ends, because “men of this character are, generally, artful and
designing, and frequently possess brilliant talents and abilities;
they commonly act in concert, and agree to share the spoils of
their country among them; they will keep their object ever in
view, and follow it with constancy.”49 There is thus an everpresent danger of cabals working deliberately and systematically
against the interests and liberties of the people. These cabals
are abetted by the small size of the legislature, as they need to
secure fewer accomplices either through bribery or “where they
ﬁnd members [of the legislature] proof against direct bribery
or gifts of ofﬁces, they will endeavor to mislead their minds by
specious and false reasoning, to impose upon their unsuspecting
honesty by an affection of zeal for the public good.”50 Either
way, the small size of the legislature aids the cabal.51 Thus, for
Brutus and Cato, numerous representatives are also necessary
to secure the legislature against bribery, corruption and general
betrayal of the public, the purpose for which they are advocated
for in Cato’s Letters.52
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Finally, to prevent the numerous, annually elected representatives
from becoming an aristocracy, it is necessary that the elections
create a rotation in ofﬁce.53 One beneﬁt of such a rotation is that
it would prevent individuals from serving so long that, despite
facing elections each year, they develop, due to the habit of
winning again and again, a separation from their constituency
that undermines their effectiveness as agents of the people.54
A rotation in ofﬁce would counter this separating tendency
in that it “would give opportunity to bring forward a greater
number of men to serve their country, and would return those,
who had served, to their state, and afford them the advantage
of becoming better acquainted with the condition and politics
of their constituents.”55 It would thus rotate into ofﬁce men
who had more recently lived as constituents and accordingly
have fresher understandings of the needs and will of the people
and return to life as a private citizen those who had served so
that they can refresh their own understandings and therefore be
better representatives if they are rotated back into ofﬁce. This
goal for using rotation in ofﬁce of reminding the representatives
of the conditions of private citizens is not limited to the AntiFederalists; it is also the rationale utilized by the Cato of Cato’s
Letters when advocating rotation in ofﬁce.56
This combination of annual elections, numerous representatives
and rotation in ofﬁce creates the constant competition that
binds the interest of those in government to the interests of the
people, the achievement of which is “the great art . . . in forming
a good constitution.”57 Constant competition causes governors
to act in accordance with the peoples’ desires in order to retain
ofﬁce.58 As those who seek to take the place of those in power
will also have to obey the people for the same reasons, “you
[the people] never will want men to execute whatever you [the
people] could design;” thus the will of the people will always
be served as opposed to the government being self-serving at
the expense of the people.59 In this manner, the annual election
of numerous representatives who are frequently rotated out
of ofﬁce serves to bind the interests of the governors to those
of the governed, which Cato considers essential as he sees
government as deteriorating into tyranny when it “erects[s] an
interest separate from the ruled.”60 While taken together, these
safeguards demonstrate that Cato’s ideal government possesses
the electoral and representative safeguards called for in Cato’s
Letters, what is even more signiﬁcant is that the Anti-Federalist
Cato conceives of these safeguards as acting through interests.61
Not only do the Anti-Federalist Cato and the Cato of Cato’s
Letters utilize the same mechanisms – annual elections, numerous
representatives and rotation in ofﬁce – but they envision them
as protecting liberty in the same manner, by bringing the
interest of those in government in line with the interests of the
people.62 It is the commonality of this underlining justiﬁcation
for taking similar precautions that speaks to the commonality
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of the political theory of the Anti-Federalist Cato and Cato’s
Letters with regards to representation.
Economic Liberty
The other type of liberty that Cato considers essential is
economic liberty, the freedom to pursue and enjoy the fruits
of one’s labor. To this end, Cato insists that taxation be light
and tariffs low, or ideally nonexistent. Of the former, he writes
that “the most natural and equitable principle of apportioning
taxes, would be in a ratio to their [the states’] property.”63 If
other principles are used to assess taxation, the people will
be subjected to “a long train of impositions which their [the
rulers’] ingenuity will suggest” as those with power seek to
prevent their lands from being taxed.64 The end result will be
that the people are forced to “submit to be numbered like the
slaves of an arbitrary despot,” while their property is taken and
the wealthy rulers escape tax free.65 In this manner, the free
citizen is deprived of a measure of his liberty, the liberty to
enjoy the beneﬁts of his virtuous industry and frugality. Thus,
when the people consent to the formation of government, it is
to protect these two types of liberty, political and economic.
However, it is with regards to the results of this economic
liberty that at ﬁrst blush Cato can appear to be less than liberal,
that is in his concern for the negative effects of commerce in
relation to virtue. Cato does express concern that “the progress
of a commercial society begets luxury, the parent of inequality,
the foe to virtue, and the enemy of restraint.”66 However, upon
further examination it becomes evident that Cato is a staunch
advocate of free trade. He envisions tariffs as a pernicious foe of
prosperity. When tariffs are imposed “the price of commodities,
useful as well as luxurious, must be increased.”67 As a result
people will buy less, causing merchants to import less and trade
to stagnate.68 With less trade, the import duties will yield less
revenue, defeating the purpose of the tariffs, which Cato says
are advocated by arguments that the revenue they produce
will ﬁnance the federal government and eliminate the need
for federal taxes.69 Regardless, the increased prices will require
increased income in order for the people to not be harmed by
the tariff.70 Cato thus concludes that ruin “must be the case for
the farmer, whose produce will not increase, not in the ratio,
with labour, utensils, and clothing; for that he must sell at the
usual price or lower, perhaps caused by the decrease of trade;
the consequence will be, that he must mortgage his farm, and
then comes the inevitable bankruptcy.”71 As a result of these
tariffs, the people are deprived of their liberty to the extent
that the merchant is not free to trade, the consumer is not free
to buy and the farmer is not free to work his lands. Thus, for
Cato liberty and commerce go hand and hand, with liberty and
the subsequent ability to enjoy the fruits of one’s own labor a
necessary condition for trade to ﬂourish. This formulation is
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essential in that it demonstrates that with regards to trade the
Anti-Federalist Cato is again in concurrence with the liberalism
of Cato’s Letters, where Trenchard and Gordon’s Cato considers
liberty to be perquisite that trade cannot exist without.72
This concern for virtue could cause one to initially suspect
a republican element to the political thought of the AntiFederalist Cato. Evaluating such a hypothesis requires examining
just what constitutes the virtue that Cato is concerned with.
While Cato does not engage in an extensive discussion of what
virtue is, consideration of Cato’s purpose for virtue allows
for the inference of what constitutes virtue for Cato. The
principle purpose of virtue for Cato is that it allows for the
preservation of liberty.73 Accordingly, virtue exists in regards to
the people’s relationship with government.74 Signiﬁcantly, Cato
conceives of the people as doing more than merely agreeing to
the government as if it were some separate entity, to him they
are also the ones whom the government consists of, stafﬁng
the government through constant competition as has been
previously discussed.75 As the government is thus composed
of the people, they must possess the qualities that are required
of good government. Thus, as “the magistrate should govern
with wisdom and justice,” and “mildness and moderation”
must prevail in government, the people must possess each of
these virtues.76 Otherwise there is nowhere for a government
staffed by the people to draw them from. In addition to stafﬁng
the government, the people also require virtue in their role
of checking the government. It is the duty of the people to
safeguard liberty by preventing government from acting too
autonomously.77 The way to do this is with constant vigilance
and distrust towards those occupying the government.78 Being
sovereign, the people can vote out those who endanger liberty
or even move to further constrain the actions available to
government in order to defend their liberty. However, in order
to fulﬁll these duties, the people must possess and cherish virtue.
Armed with industry and frugality, men will naturally rally to
cause of liberty; having to “acquire property by their own toil,”
and be thrifty with what was gained by the sweat of their brow,
men will be tenacious in defense of their liberty.79 But when
these virtuous are undermined by “luxury, dissipation and a
passion for aristocratic distinctions,” liberty is “of course, less
respected, and protected” by the people, making them more
likely to accept tyranny.80 Thus, the virtue that Cato requires
from the people for the proper operation of government and
defense of liberty is a multifaceted combination of wisdom,
justice, mildness, moderation, vigilance, industry and frugality.
Being thus broken down into its component parts makes it
evident that the virtue Cato conceives of is a far cry from the
self-sacriﬁcing austerity of classical republicanism. Granted,
both the Anti-Federalist Cato and Plutarch’s Cato conceptualize
frugality as having a role in public life, however, the AntiBRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

Federalist Cato lacks a constant dedication to state before self
as a component of virtue. Instead, the Anti-Federalist Cato’s
virtue focuses on the preservation of the individual’s right to
liberty, an inherently liberal formulation.
Conclusion
That the Anti-Federalist Cato makes properly structured
representation the essential tool for the preservation of the
people’s political and economic liberty in much the same way
that Trenchard and Gordon do in Cato’s Letters demonstrates
the liberal nature of the Anti-Federalist Cato’s political thought.
What makes this particularly fascinating is that, in light of the
general agreement regarding the liberal nature of Federalist
political theory, it means that the debate between the Federalists
and the Anti-Federalists was not a debate between two separate
schools of thought, as would be the case if the debate were
between republicanism and liberalism, but was in fact a debate
within liberalism. On the one hand, Anti-Federalist liberalism
shows the inﬂuence of John Locke, emphasizing the preservation
of the natural rights of the individual and considering the most
signiﬁcant threat to these rights to be government. Conversely,
Federalist liberalism demonstrates the inﬂuence of the Scottish
Enlightenment, viewing the greatest threat to the rights of the
individual as being not government, but the people themselves.
This difference is at the very core of the debate between the
Federalists and Anti-Federalists, shaping their opinions with
regards to the proper scope, role and structure of government,
particularly whether steps are to check the government or the
people. Thus, what is gleaned from the study of the AntiFederalist Cato is that the debate between the Federalists
and the Anti-Federalists was driven not by the fundamental
differences between liberalism and republicanism, but by
differing fundamental assumptions within liberalism.
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